The Right to Self–determination and Individual rights in the Era of Decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of UNESCO. by Morvaridi, Behrooz
 The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please refer to the 
repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from the repository home 
page for further information. 
To see the final version of this work please visit the publisher’s website. Available access to 
the published online version may require a subscription. 
Link to publisher’s version: 
http://www.davidpublisher.org/index.php/Home/Journal/detail?journalid=45&jx=hr 
Citation:   Morvaridi B (2011) The Right to Self–determination and Individual rights in the Era of 
Decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of History Research, 10(1): 19–35. 
Copyright statement: © 2011 David Publishing. Published Open Access and reproduced in 
accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This work is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. 
 
History Research, ISSN 2159-550X 
December 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, 19-34 
 
 The Right to Self-determination and Individual Rights in 
the Era of Decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa:       
The Case of UNESCO 
Behrooz Morvaridi  
University of Bradford, UK 
 
This paper examines the conceptual origins of individual rights that shaped the UN and UNESCO model of human 
rights and the origins of group rights as they emerged in the post–colonial era to challenge inequality. It argues that 
the idea of rights to self determination, associated initially with decolonization in Africa based on equal statehood 
status in international relations, has, since decolonization, reinvigorated the promotion of group or peoples’ rights 
as a framework for challenging poverty and inequality, including access or rights to development.  
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Introduction 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent conventions enshrined in the charter of 
the United Nations and reflected in its programs, declarations and resolutions, were turning points in modern 
history. The epistemological underpinning of the Human Rights declaration originates in the concept of 
“natural rights” and the “Rights of Man”, reflecting the notion that all individuals are equal and should 
universally receive fundamental freedoms without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status (Article 2). Within 
this conception, the very concept of ‘right’ denotes equal worth of human beings and equal entitlement 
regardless of location or situation. To say that an individual has a “right” to something suggests entitlement and 
that something is owed. In this sense, “right” is a legitimate political demand expressed in terms of claims and 
entitlements and the state has a duty to deliver or protect them.  
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) on December 10, 1948 and 48 states subsequently signed up to it. However, the universalism captured 
in the UDHR has not been uncontested. Scepticism and challenge to the concept of individual and natural rights 
expressed by the African states established following decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, shows how the 
particular context of African Peoples had no influence over the construction of the UDHR. Their main 
contention was the way in which the conceptualisation of human rights appears to glorify a “gross 
individualism” and provide scant regard for other cultures and philosophies that balance the rights of the 
individual alongside responsibilities and duties to communities. The UHDR package of rights pays little 
attention to the particularity of situations and their uniqueness or history, which is why since de-colonisation 
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there have been frequent calls for a more contextually sensitive universalism.  
This is captured in an article that was published in UNESCO’s “Courier” in 1938, in which Richard Write, 
“the Negro Writer of ‘Bright and Morning Star’ and ‘Native Sons’”, is quoted: “In Africa, for the most part, 
individual will and initiative are almost unknown and are largely considered sinful. All work and endeavour is 
done under the guidance of traditional ceremony” (Grierson, 1948).  
A central contentious issue was not disagreement about the generic values that underpin human rights, as 
captured in the UDHR, but the UDHR’s lack of recognition of the right to self-determination for which many 
African countries had struggled for so many years. This mode of self-determination was considered to be a 
group right and one that was about determining independence and the freedom to choose social economic and 
political institutions without external intervention and coercion. Asserting what has become known as third 
generation rights, continues today to be part of a wider movement to redress the economic, social and political 
inequality between African and developed countries. This paper discusses how the declaration of 1948 has been 
criticised for its universalism mantra and for prioritising political and civil rights (the first generation of human 
rights) over economic, social and cultural rights (the second generation of rights). The third generation of rights 
are discussed in the context of Africa and Asia, where assertion of collective rights and the rights of peoples 
have been most prevalent.  
While UNESCO adopted a universal values approach to human rights that is both individual and 
transnational, the organisation questioned the concept of the right to self-determination out of concern about its 
vagueness. To understand UNESCO’s engagement with the human rights discourse in Africa, we need to 
consider the historical context. This paper therefore examines the conceptual origins of individual rights that 
shaped the UN and UNESCO model of human rights and the origins of group rights as they emerged in the 
post–colonial era to challenge poverty and inequality. It argues that the idea of rights to self determination, 
associated initially with decolonisation in Africa based on equal statehood status in international relations, has, 
since decolonisation, invigorated the promotion of group or peoples’ rights as a framework for challenging 
poverty and inequality, including access or rights to development.  
The Theoretical Basis of Human Rights 
With the formation of the United Nations following the Second World War, the rights discourse flourished 
on the global stage. The UN was to take a leading role in addressing the inhumanities and abuses of World War 
II. To this end, the Human Rights Commission of the UN (Chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt) was formed to 
prepare the drafting of a Universal Bill of Human Rights that would set a clear framework for its operation. 
UNESCO was tasked with providing the theoretical and philosophical foundations of a Human Rights 
Declaration. Julian Huxley, who was appointed as president of UNESCO in 1946, was instrumental in 
promoting the idea of human rights and contributed greatly to the debate1. In 1947 the UNESCO Committee on 
the Theoretical Basis of Human Rights, chaired by British Diplomat and Professor of International politics 
Edward H Carr, was charged with the daunting task of preparing a report on Human Rights for the UN 
Commission of the Economic and Social Council. The objective of this committee was to scrutinise the 
theoretical foundations of UDHR by way of worldwide participation and consultation. The committee 
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The Right to Self-determination and Individual Rights in the Era of Decolonization  
in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of UNESCO 
 
21
consulted philosophers, scholars and member states by sending identified participants questionnaires on the 
principles underlying the Rights of Man. It is important to point out that questionnaires were sent not only to 
National Commissioners, but also directly to individual scholars who were asked to consider “the rational 
interpretation and justification of those rights of individuals which society must respect and which are 
desirable” (Maritain, 1948). UNESCO received 79 replies2. The majority shared common convictions on the 
whole notion of Human Rights, underpinned by universal values, morality and freedoms. However, there were 
some ideological and political variances, reflecting the different philosophic principles and divergent political 
and economic backgrounds of participants. In the words of the French philosopher Jacque Maritain, who wrote 
the introduction to the final report?  
“From the point of view of philosophical doctrine it may be said, without over simplification that, as regards 
the question of Human Rights, men are totally divided …into two antagonistic groups: those who to a greater or 
lesser extent explicitly accept, and those who to a greater or lesser extent explicitly reject, ‘natural law’ as the basis 
of their rights” (1948, p. 4). 
Those who rejected the proposals based on the idea of natural rights were mostly of a Marxist persuasion 
and of the belief that “modern” ideas of rights that were formulated within Western political philosophy were 
apt only for a capitalist economy. And, not surprisingly, it was within mainly liberalist paradigms that they 
were embedded. While Marx and Marxists promoted collective rights, liberalism reflected a commitment to 
individual rights. We must not forget that equality for all was and is at the heart of any liberal political vision 
and social justice discourse. The liberal social contract theory of Locke, Rousseau, Mills and Kant was founded 
on the concept of rights as equality, that is to say, the idea that human beings are fundamentally equal and that 
individuals should therefore be treated equally. These thinkers encapsulated the dynamism of the 
Enlightenment in Europe, which rejected the stronghold of tradition and religious teleology, by promoting a 
commitment to free inquiry, rationality, reason, power of knowledge and scientific innovation.  
The idea of natural rights, that underpins liberalism and liberalist rights theory, was developed on the 
threshold of capitalist development. Liberalist rights theory reflects a commitment to individual autonomy, 
equality, liberty and freedom–all concepts that were defined and constructed in a society based on a market 
economy and the ownership of private property3. What was not considered was the relevance of this to Africa 
where in the absence of a market economy, land in the main was not privately owned. The formation of export 
economies under colonial rule had required reorganisation of the economic activities of local people under the 
new ruling elites of the colonial state–white settlers and companies mainly from Europe. The subsequent 
mobilisation of labour fragmented traditional social relations and ways of life, forcing the black population to 
move to communal or reserved areas while white people occupied large areas of the most fertile lands.  
In many African countries, tribal chiefs were given rights to land through lineage leadership and therefore 
controlled its allocation for homes, crop cultivation and communal usage, such as grazing land. In fact the right 
to occupy land depended on being accepted as part of a community, under the jurisdiction of the village 
                                                                 
2 approximately 50% of the individual scholars responses was received.  
3 In a very different historical and cultural context in France, the whole notion of rights instigated a new discourse that justified 
the transition from a feudal society of patronage and hierarchy to one of bourgeois social relations based on property rights. Under 
the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Social Contract (that was adopted in 1789 as the French declaration of “the Rights of 
Man”) promoted the liberal mantra that “men are born and remain free and have equal rights”, as a fairly direct response to 
Rousseau’s famous remark “Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains” (Rousseau, 1968). The idea of the Rights of Man was 
not without its critics from the emerging capitalist class that, through economic liberalism, justified a utilitarian approach to 
society.  
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headman who allocated the community’s estate. Thus individuals’ rights of control were as secure as ownership 
could be, through the mechanism that no one had the right to dispose of land individually, and could only do so 
after consultation with the lineage family and the village headman. Many such customary arrangements that 
place land in the trust of village chiefs continue to prevail today. They do not require legal frameworks, as 
traditional authority and responsibility is embedded within the moral obligations of a leader. Of course in many 
cases this power is abused through patronage and fosters both challenge and resistance to change. 
Colonial rulers constructed a rural, tribal identity for indigenous populations in Africa as a means of 
establishing political administrative control over customary rights. Traditional authority and forms of social 
organisation or customary rights have tended to be viewed as contradicting modern forms of social organisation 
and liberal ideas that promote individual property rights and which have been introduced in the wake of 
colonisation. This dualism is often judged as being a prime obstacle to development. The main contradiction 
seemed to be that rights principles based on individualistic land ownership could not work in areas where land 
is collectively managed through kinship. Concerns included the potential exclusion of women and vulnerable 
groups from livelihood support. The problems that we might seek to address today through the human rights 
discourse were not considered to be social problems before the creation of capitalist market economies and 
modern nation states. To some extent this view has been carried forward into the contemporary liberal tradition 
where we find that the legitimacy of the institution of private property is considered to be a necessary condition 
for individual self-preservation; frequently argued to be core to social justice (Cohen, 1995, p. 56).  
To the early Liberals this shift from tradition to modernity represented the progress needed to improve the 
well being of the human condition. In fact natural rights, derived from reason, self-evidence, or an empirical 
conception of ‘nature’, and based on the study of how humans actually behave, were the basis upon which 
critiques of traditional society4 were founded (Campbell, 2006, p. 7). Although the early liberal theory of 
social contract advocated that civil society involved the rule of majority, it was in itself incomplete in that, as 
Russell points out, it excluded women, the poor, children and indigenous people from the rights of citizenship. 
It also excluded those who did not own property, mainly the working class and peasants (1979, p. 607). In short 
the earlier classical liberals were preoccupied with civil and political rights and the objective of giving 
individuals freedom from abuses of the state. They were less concerned with economic, social and cultural 
rights or how poverty could be addressed. The desire to separate civil and political rights from social, economic, 
and cultural rights remains one of the main challenges of the implementation of the right to development. To 
this end, more recently Nozick, Rawls, Dworkin, Cohen and Sen have extended the debate that the early rights 
theorists started to cover a much broader spectrum of interpretations. 
Other contributors to the theoretical basis of human rights as defined in 1948 went so far as to suggest that 
the idea of ‘natural rights’ actually defied the nature and legitimacy of existing paradigms of power in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Stammers (1995, p. 448) confirms this in suggesting that rights. As 
perceived by the early liberal theorists, in fact, both challenged and sustained power relations. The dichotomy 
                                                                 
4 The basic tenant of the early theorists on rights was that all individuals should be treated as equals. For Locke individuals “are 
naturally in, …a state of perfect freedom and equality. The equality of men by nature …[is] the foundation of that obligation to 
mutual love amongst men.” (Locke, 1952, p. 4). This reflects a fundamental understanding of what is meant by “natural” in 
contrast to an understanding of society based on theological beliefs and institutional explanation. The whole notion of the social 
contract is based on mutual advantage, in that rational people get together and decide to leave the state of nature and to govern 
themselves by law in civil society. The language of rights was used to challenge divine rights, absolutist power and traditional 
forms of power relations, such as the ascendancy of hierarchy by rank, caste or birth. 
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of the private and public realm on the threshold of capitalist development did evolve into a concept of rights 
that recognised the threat of the state and the concept of civil society. However it also fulfilled an ideological 
role of reinforcing prevailing relations of power. In a similar vein, Huxley’s paper(1948) on “The Right of Man 
and the Facts of the Human Situation” written as a contribution to the debate suggests that UN’s legislative 
approach to human rights would not in itself address issues of inequality, poverty and power relations: 
“A constitutional Bill of rights, whose principles are applied in specific legislation, can certainly do something 
to protect the masses of ordinary, unprivileged men and women against the few who, through wealth or hierarchical 
position effectively wield power over the majority. But prevention is always better than cure. Mere paper restriction, 
designed to curb the abuse of a power already concentrated in a few hands, are but the mitigations of an existing 
evil. Personal liberty can be secure only by abolishing the evil altogether. UNESCO is engaged at present in 
facilitating the task of mitigation; but it is in the fortunate position of being able to proceed, if it so desires, to the 
incomparably more important task of prevention, of the radical removal of the present impediments to liberty” (p. 
206). 
In response to the UNESCO questionnaire, Tohechko, a Soviet Professor of Law, sent a paper entitled 
“The conception of the rights of Man in the USSR” (1949), expressing his clear view that the conception of 
human rights that was being promoted by the UN did not fit all societies. A similar view was reflected by Carr 
and other members of the committee in the conclusions that UNESCO’s drew from the articles and detailed 
questionnaire distributed. The main issues was the hierarchy of rights, with civil and political rights or freedom 
of opinion and expression having priority over economic and social rights It was argued that a persistent 
imbalance in the articulation of economic and social rights evidences inequalities and tensions not only 
between the powerless and the powerful or rich and poor individuals within states, but also between states 
themselves. The committee therefore recommended that economic and social rights were recognised as well as 
individual civil and political rights that primarily relate to freedom of opinion and expression. 
Scholars from the Soviet Union, who contributed to the Theoretical Basis of Human Rights debate, were 
explicit that the Bill of rights did not necessary serve all political and economic formations, most notably those 
of the Soviet Union, Africa and Asia. Some Asian States questioned the acceptance of a universal rights 
standard and criticised Western policy for its “double standards” in imposing “Western values” that effectively 
violated their sovereignty. In reality a whole range of complicating factors challenge the articulation of rights 
and individual agency. Mostly advocated by Western liberal states, the way that rights are institutionalized and 
mediated tends to focus on civil and political rights, based on the principles that states exist to protect civil 
society and to defend and uphold property rights. This liberalism has, nonetheless, been considered to represent 
“false universalisms” (Falk, 2001), promoting an equality that is merely formal rather than substantive and one 
that prioritizes the individual’s civil and political rights over social and economic rights. In other words this 
accommodates the position of Western countries.  
In submitting their report to the United Nations Commission in 1947, UNESCO promoted the 
dissemination of the debate on the different ideas that had been put forward by selected scholars, in a 
publication of papers together with the Committee’s conclusions. The objective was to promote growth of 
public interest in the philosophical problem of Human Rights, perhaps with the intention of pushing the 
boundaries on the debate about a lack of recognition of social and economic and cultural rights. However, it 
was not an approach supported by the United Nations Commission, and after several meetings UNESCO was 
persuaded to postpone publication of the report. The Commission recommends that the report should only be 
distributed to the members of the Commission, and not all member states (E/CN.4/SR.26). There was also 
The Right to Self-determination and Individual Rights in the Era of Decolonization  
in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of UNESCO 
 
24 
consensus that UNESCO should not publish the report until member states had adopted the UN Universal 
Human rights Declaration. The UN Commission was wary of the divisive tone of the UNESCO report and to 
avoid upsetting any member states, the UNHRD was adopted without delay. Although the UNHRD was 
non-binding and many states adopted the common normative framework that it represented, others refused to 
do so on ideological grounds. The UNESCO report was distributed and published in 1949 entitled Human 
Rights, Comments and Interpretation, with an Introduction by Jacque Maritain. 
Of the many philosophers and scholars to whom UNESCO sent long and detailed questionnaires to elicit 
their opinions, 85% were from western and eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union and the 
USA. Only a few were from ‘Third World’ Courtiers (Brazil, China and India5 mainly). The upshot of this was 
that in generating the UNHRD, there was no engagement of people from Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1947 only 41 
countries were members of UN, and Sub-Saharan Africa was represented by the colonial powers and empires 
that dominated and exploited the continent. Until 1960, there were only four members in UN General Assembly 
from Sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Guinea) and they had no voice or influence. And yet 
the shared history of colossal inequalities and human rights violations that African nations suffered under 
colonial rule, would shape how they viewed rights as a key part of national independence. It should have been 
no surprise that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, which in ascribing to the liberal principle 
of equality and universality gave prominence to individual rights and not to group or collective rights, would 
for African people and states prove to be inadequate. 
The Ideological Dilemma-Different Cultural and Historical Interpretations of Human Rights 
The committee responsible for the theoretical Bases of Human Rights welcomed the fact that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a ‘radical departure’ from the French and American Bill of human 
rights or what has become to be known as the first generation of rights, in that it had more emphasis on rights to 
education, a better protection of employers6. Its origin nevertheless was Eurocentric and grounded in the 
promotion of civil and political rights. The committee concluded that “the history of philosophic discussion of 
human rights, of the dignity and brotherhood of man, and of his common citizenship in the great society is long: 
it extends beyond the narrow limits of the Western tradition and its beginnings in the West as well as the East 
coincide with the beginnings of philosophy” (UNESCO, 1948, Appendix, p. 3).  
As discussed above, the modern Bill of Rights that underpins the UN declarations is derived from Western 
political philosophy. Is this because there are no alternative philosophical, economic and political approaches to 
those developed in the West or an insufficient body of knowledge about them? Even though we associate the 
                                                                 
5 Ghandi’s response gives a flavour of how diversely rights can be interpreted. His response was brief, but supportive of the idea 
that human rights is not abstract and philosophical, but comes from the heart of society: “I learnt from illiterate, but wise mother 
that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very rights to live accrue to us only when we do 
the duty of citizenship of the world”. From this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of man 
and woman and correct every rights to some corresponding duty to the first performed. Every other right can be shown to be as 
usurpation. Hardly worth fighting for. Yours Sincerely M. K. Ghandi (UNESCO, 1948). 
6 It was through the discourse on natural rights of the Enlightenment period that the first generation of rights’ activists was born. 
Their activities were manifested mostly in the promotion of civil and political rights. This was first reflected through the US 
Declaration of Independence in 1776 or Bill of Rights and the enshrining of natural rights in the text of the Constitution. In a very 
different historical and cultural context in France, the whole notion of rights instigated a new discourse that justified the transition 
from a feudal society of patronage and hierarchy to one of bourgeois social relations based on property rights. Under the influence 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Social Contract (that was adopted in 1789 as the French declaration of “the Rights of Man”) 
promoted the liberal mantra that “men are born and remain free and have equal rights”, as a fairly direct response to Rouseau’s 
famous remark “Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains” (Rousseau, 1968).  
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term “rights” with the European Enlightenment, its component ideas have deep roots in many other traditions 
(Nussbaum, 1999, p. 8). It is also evident that how rights and obligations are discharged in Western and 
non-Western settings can vary, and that notions of rights and social justice are historically and culturally shaped. 
The idea of justice and rights is not new but can be found in the philosophies of many ancient civilizations and 
cultures from the Greeks and the Romans through to the Persians, Indians, Chinese and Africans. In 
pre-capitalist or pre-modern periods, social hierarchy and the differentiation that went with it allowed rights to 
be wrapped up in the privileges of status, such that to view wives and slaves as property was considered to be 
the natural order created by God (s). Similarly the chain of command that existed during the Roman period 
ascribed rights through birth and citizenship. Some of these interpretations are manifested today in cultural or 
religious contexts, for example, the Indian caste system. During the Medieval era despite a moral obligation to 
treat all individuals equally in Christian or Islamic societies, discrimination persisted between believer and 
non-believers and between the rulers and the ruled. In all of these early contexts the behaviors of rulers were 
not questioned by the majority, in other words individuals did not have the natural right to question authority.  
Values and rights often reflect traditions that for centuries are passed on from one generation to the next 
through unwritten rules, archives of cumulated experiences and oral histories, as is the case in Africa where 
cultural heritage and knowledge is largely oral. Nelson Mandela (1995) provides us with a nice example of how 
rights and social justice are embedded in tradition and passed from one generation to the next, in his case 
through “the wise men who retained the knowledge of tribal history and custom in their heads and whose 
opinion carried great weight”. He describes how tribal meetings represented democracy in its purest form with 
all tribal members allowed to attend and speak, with decisions taken jointly: “There may have been hierarchy of 
importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard…People spoke without interruption and the meeting 
lasted for many hours. The foundation of self government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and 
were equal in their value as citizens…Women I am afraid were deemed second citizens…” Although these 
institutions and customary laws provided transparency, their hierarchical relations should not be romanticised. 
This conception of human rights was an essential aspect of African humanism (Asante, 1969, p. 7). There is 
synergy between the basic values the underlie “human rights” and the values of many traditional African 
societies, but there are differences in the way in which they and the practises established to implement them 
(Penna and Campbell, 1998; Donnally, 2003). 
In 1947, the crucial point that UN and UNESCO missed was the need to recognise, what is clear to us 
today, that universal rights can have different cultural and historical origins. Perhaps we can understand how, in 
the context of 1947, the early Eurocentric ideas of liberalism of one sort or another influenced the theory and 
practice of UN and UNESCO, but it cannot be denied that the absence of culturally informed ideas from Africa 
within the human rights discourse were a significant shortcoming. The tension that existed between the Global 
North’s conceptualisation of political and civil rights that emphasise the individual and the Global South’s 
inclination for economic, social and cultural rights and the right for self determination, gained momentum 
during the era of independence. We should not forget that this was also during the period of cold war rivalry. 
States from the south insisted on the UN adopting a broader and more “multidimensional” understanding of 
rights specifically in relation to social and economic rights. In response, in 1966 the UN accepted a division 
between social and economic rights on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other by dividing the 
common normative framework of the Declaration on Human Rights into two International Covenants–one on 
Social and Economic and Cultural Rights and the second on Civil and Political Rights. Both Covenants in 
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Article 1 state that “All peoples have Rights to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. 
Essentially decolonization and the rise of liberation movements radically altered the political realities 
facing the institutions of global governance the late 1950s. As an institution, UNESCO had to confront the 
discourse on cultural rights and the question of reconciling the idea of ‘united culture’ and ‘unity in variety’, as 
advocated by Huxley in his inaugural paper of 1946, with the right to self determination. Huxley’s evolutionary 
humanist perspective of a ‘universal culture’ permeated thinking on the links between culture and human rights 
within UNESCO: 
“Attention should consequently be given by UNESCO to the problem of constructing a unified pool of 
tradition for the human species as a whole. This, as indicated elsewhere, must include the unity-in-variety of the 
world’s art and culture as well as the promotion of one single pool of scientific knowledge. But it must also 
eventually include a unified common outlook and a common set of purposes. This will be the latest part of the task 
of unifying the world mind; but UNESCO must not neglect it while engaged on the easier jobs, like that of 
promoting a single pool of scientific knowledge and effort” (Huxley, 1949, p. 21).  
During UNESCO’s early period “culture” was “employed as a structuring concept to guide the 
development of artistic production in member states”. In an Article published in the Courier in September 1949 
entitled Change and Decay, Huxley provides a good description of this in the context of Africa: 
“I was deeply impressed by the range and variety of its traditional art, and above all by the vigour and high 
quality. West Africa gives us the bronzes and terracotta of Ife, whose classical style, unique in black Africa, poses 
fascinating historical questions…..; It gives us the delightful gold weights of Ashanti; the rich costumes of 
hundreds of native rituals; the bronzes of Benin in which barbarism touches the heights of splendour; 
wood-carvings with the natural strength and sense the form after which modern Western sculpture is striving; 
masks in endless variety, some of what we are accustomed to think of as pure negro type, others recalling the style 
of the Far East, others reminiscent of Red Indians or of sophisticated night-clubs in New York, comic masks with 
hinged jaws looking like Charlie Maoarthy, horrifying masks (If the gods of disease, ivory masks with the tragic 
thing. however, is that in West Africa, as almost everywhere else, this primitive art is rapidly disappearing. ….” 
(Huxley, 1949, p. 21) 
His reference to ‘primitive art’ does not mean crude or poor art, but rather describes the traditional art of 
peoples have not reached the technical levels of organization that the sociologists call civilization. In this early 
period for UNESCO “Culture” denoted cultural productions–works of art and letters, architecture, cuisine and 
cultural activities including the preservation and protection of art, heritage, and artists (Stenou et al., 2004, p. 7). 
It did not refer to particular social relations with unique traditions, language, religion, identity and ways of life. 
One should not presume that Huxely was wrong or right in his understanding, as these ideas are contextual and 
time-related. The issue more generally relates to processes of knowledge production and transformation (Long, 
2004, p. 25). This lies at the heat of understanding how ideas travel, or are relocated and reconstituted to 
acquire new meanings and in response to the changing needs of different societies.  
There appeared to be tension within UNESCO on the trade-off between unity and difference and this 
generated both theoretical and practical problems in the organization (UNESCO, 2000, p. 5). This was at a time 
when people from Africa and other developing countries were demanding their rights to development. Culture, 
identities and particularism were being incorporated into the political discourse of African liberation 
movements articulating peoples’ rights to self determination and self government.  
UNESCO’s response, reflecting an understanding of the direct relevance of peoples’ rights to cultural 
identity and educational practice, was to adopt a broader and more “multidimensional” understanding of culture 
in the Declaration on the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation in 1960. Article 1 clearly specifies 
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that “Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved” moreover “every people has 
the right and duty to develop its culture”. The UN’s recognition of peoples’ rights to their own culture 
established an initial link between human rights, human dignity and culture. This was an important step in 
bringing culture into the political mainstream of international relations, and allowed the idea to emerge that 
cultural diversity could serve as a basis for endogenous development. In 1982 this was captured in a significant 
epistemological shift in UNESCO with a broadening of the definition of culture in the context of human rights: 
“The set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of society or a social group. 
In addition to art and literature, it encompasses lifestyles, basic human rights, value systems, traditions, and 
beliefs.” 
This was followed in 2001 with the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity: 
“This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making 
up humankind. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind 
as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and 
affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations” (Article 1). 
In linking cultural identity to the general goals and means of development for the newly independent and 
developing countries, meant that they demanded both appreciation and respect as a set of political and 
economic choices.  
Rights to self-determination-the African Charter of Human Rights  
The critical point in this debate was the structure of the new global order that emerged post-colonialism, a 
global order based on the socialist model of development on the one hand and a market economy under the 
political hegemony of a few powerful states, not least the USA, on the other. This transition was not smooth 
however, not least because the colonial powers did not prepare indigenous populations for independence and 
therefore it is no surprise that their retreat happened before organized indigenous political movements emerged. 
The legacy of colonial rule had in many cases exacerbated African problems, as O’Sullivan points out, “leaving 
behind legacies of arbitrary borders, underdeveloped infrastructure, economic exploitation, ethnic and racial 
divisions, and overdependence on the production of raw materials”. In the post-colonial political vacuum, 
superpower interest in Africa compounded the already ‘difficult process of decolonization and state building’ 
(O’Sollivan, 2005, p. 105).  
As a source of collective identity, the right to self-determination provided a framework for establishing the 
credibility of national determination and independence and for challenging post-colonial inequality. This was 
clearly aimed at the elimination of obstacles to development in the newly emerged countries, many of which 
aspired, somewhat ambitiously, to ‘catch up’ with western modernisation. These ‘Third World’ states maintained 
that political independence required equality with other nations and those economic, social and cultural rights 
would empower the marginal states and their people to realise their independence and political liberty. 
Increasingly as African people asserted their demands for equality and autonomy on the world stage, they 
pressed the international legal order for recognition of group rights. For example the right of self-determination 
in international law is a component of the “Law of People” (Campbell, 2006).  
In June 1981, the African Charter of Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights was adopted by the organisation 
of African Unity consisting of 54 states. It was subsequently ratified by 53 States and entered into force for 
implementation on October 1986 through the African Commission on Human and People’s rights based in 
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Banjul, the Gambia. The Charter stipulates self-determination, group rights, the right to development and 
minority rights (Organisation of African Unity, 1981). Article 20 specifies that: 
“All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to 
self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social 
development according to the policy they have freely chosen.”  
Some scholars from Africa argue vehemently that the African conception of Society is embedded in the 
African Charter, as it indicates that the individual in society does not live in isolation and independent from the 
community. In African social relations, the individual is considered to largely exist through and by their 
relationship with the group of their birth (Kiwanuka, 1988; Mutuwa, 1995).  
The former director of the Division of Human Rights and Peace of UNESCO, Kark Vasak, endorsed the 
Charter by referring to it as capturing the “third generation of human rights”. According to Vasak, the idea of 
third generation of human rights resonate the French Revolution of 1789 which was based on the Principe of 
fraternity, solidarity and collective rights and he associate the second generation of rights to equality and the 
first generation to liberty and the third generation based on the principle of solidarity rights and fraternity 
including the right to development, right to environment, and minority rights. These are collective or group 
rights and not individual rights and there were incorporated in the African Charter of People’s Rights. This 
mode of self determination is part of wider view of development that redresses the economic and political 
inequity between developing and developed countries.  
Interestingly as early as 1948, the committee on Theoretical Foundation of Human Rights was cautious 
about the concept of self-determination and groups rights and raised this in their report to UN Commission on 
Human Rights (see above) because of the issue of implementation: 
“The end of the first world War saw an early attempt at a general formulation of the rights of groups, in the 
shape of the principle of national self-determination; but its incompleteness and vagueness were speedily realised 
when the results of efforts to put it into practical operation were appraised. To the last few decades also belong the 
attempt to formulate the rights of nations and similar groups in relations to the rights of international or 
supra–national groupings-attempts which are still continuing” (UNESCO, 1948, Appendix I, p. 3).  
Criticism of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) has been taken up by not only nation 
states and particularly fervently by some Asian States7, but also by groups that believed they were excluded 
from society as a whole and through the global division of labour. Feminists, for example, were critical of 
UNHRD demand for not recognising social groups, arguing that women’s marginalisation and oppression 
requires a critical explanation. Young identifies women as a distinctive social group that suffers systematic 
forms of injustice and argues convincingly for social justice to conceptualise group identity and associated 
rights as well as individual ones. Otherwise we risk a narrow conception of justice that has as its central goal 
                                                                 
7 Since the 1980s the rights debate has moved into one about cultural relativism. Asian states for example have asserted the view 
that controlling personal freedoms under strong state leadership is acceptable to “secure public order, greater economic growth 
and preservation of religious and social values” (Chang, 2004). Whether the Asian values thesis is in fact genuine or is political 
expediency for authoritarianism and repressive regime is of course debatable. While cultures may differentially conceptualise 
duties and responsibilities, critiques of this version of the Asian position have argued that States employ the concept of individual 
“duty” to the wider community for political ends to maintain their powerbase, brush aside their human rights violation, and silence 
the opposition (Sen, 1999; Cox, 2002). In fact Asian leaders have rejected the use of Western human rights as an instrument of 
political and economic conditionality and legitimate humanitarian intervention, stressing the importance of national sovereignty 
and the principles of non-intervention in domestic affairs. When the economic development of some Asian states, such as China, 
has been criticised for being at the expense of civil and political rights, they have countered argued that their social and economic 
stability and success was founded on Asian values, culture and traditions that emphasized community and duty rather than 
individualism. Within this context the Universal Rights agenda is branded as the “cultural imperialism” of the West.  
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the self-development of one’s human capacities. Defining racial and gender justice in terms of the distribution 
of privileged positions among individuals, according to Young, fails to question decision-making power and 
structural power within institutional organisations and fails to acknowledge different causes of oppression, such 
as status, hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and cultural imperialism (Young, 1990, p. 193). Such unequal 
social relations generate, and are often thought to justify inequalities, in the distribution of freedoms, resources, 
and welfare.  
For UNESCO the challenge has been how to empower both individuals and groups to articulate their 
rights, while understanding which group rights would take precedence. This is the crux of the issues that 
UNESCO has been critically engaged with since late 1980s and subject to debate by a panel of international 
experts who met at UNESCO headquarters in 1989. Even though the experts supported the idea of peoples’ 
rights as universally recognised in conventions, there was a continuing and legitimate debate about the meaning 
of rights to self–determination and the balance between individual and peoples’ rights, as it was pointed out in 
their report:  
“Unfortunately, some of language used in some contributions to the debate on peoples’ rights, over the past ten 
years has given rise, perhaps unwittingly, to confusion. Thus, the image of the ‘third generation’ human rights, as 
including people’s rights, is liable to be misunderstanding as suggesting that earlier generations of rights–such as 
the first generation of civil and political rights, might now be discarded. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
The notion of peoples’ and human rights are distinct. Although each is an aspect of the international ‘rights’ debate, 
and each ultimately impinges on individual human beings, the two concepts should not be confused” (UNESCO, 
1989, p. 5). 
However to qualify as a ‘people’ requires a common historical tradition; racial or ethnic identity; cultural 
homogeneity linguistic unity; religious or ideological affinity; territorial connection; and a common economic 
life. UNESCO concedes that “the group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or the 
consciousness of being a people”. It has been crucial for UNESCO to take a firm position as the debate 
challenges hegemonic states such as USA. Following UNESCO’s endorsement of ‘the rights of people for self 
determination’ in 1984 the United States under President Ronald Reagan withdrew membership from UNESCO 
on the grounds that “UNESCO has no respect for individual rights” and anti–western bias8. According to US 
state department: 
“UNESCO has been pressured, particularly, by African States (encouraged by Soviet Block), to give equal or 
greater attention to ‘to rights of people’. …This stress on collective rights tends to strengthen the prerogative of 
non-democratic state, at the expense of the human rights of individuals” (US department of state’s policy, 1984, p. 2).  
The real issue for the UNESCO Expert Panel was not that the categories of peoples’ rights and individual 
rights should not be seen as closely linked to the defence of the human person, but that the idea of “peoples” 
rights represented genuine intellectual difference of opinion (Ibid:8). Countries from the South, including 
Sub-Saharan Africa, articulated a clear view that a rights-based claim to development would be a major step 
forward in addressing imbalanced relations between countries, linking their claim to years of colonial 
exploitation and domination of their resources that left them socially and economically excluded in the global 
order. Article 22 of the African Charter points out that:  
“(1) All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their 
freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. (2) States shall have the duty, 
                                                                 
8 In December 1985 The United Kingdom too pulled out its support for UNESCO for its “inefficient management, meaningless 
studies and excessive expenditure.” As a result, UNESCO lost 30 percent of its budget. 
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individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development”.  
The demand for rights of nations to self-determination and recognition of collective rights is a key driver 
of the right to development and the linking of development with human rights. The idea that social and 
economic development would only be achieved if new nations were in an equal relationship with other nation 
states was pivotal to their engagement in a globalised economy. The UN’s response in 1986 was the 
Declaration on the Right to Development. This was ratified by over 100 countries9 and was the result of many 
years of international campaigns centred on addressing inequalities between states and promoting the social, 
economic and political rights of the self governing state. It promoted a new international economic order based 
on equality between nations, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all states (Article 3). It 
also presented an attempt to synthesise how civil and political rights intersect with other rights, including social, 
economic, and cultural rights and how national self-determination and collective rights also promote individual 
human rights. This was clearly specified in Article 1 and 2 of Right to Development: 
Article 1 (1). The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised. 
Ariticle 1 (2). The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of people to 
self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on 
Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources. 
The Right to Development adopts a normative understanding of international human rights, as framed in 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights 1948. The phrase “every human person and all peoples are entitled to ... 
enjoy ...development” implies that the right to development has both individual and collective relevance. The 
claim that individuals and groups have “rights to” development implies strong normative concerns and moral 
force. In other words the noun “right” as in “rights to” development denotes entitlements on an equal basis for 
both individuals, and the collective. It is within this context that rights do not only benefit the rights’ holders 
but more importantly they empower them. In view of this, “rights” are a legitimate political demand expressed 
in terms of claims and entitlement that the state has a duty to deliver or protect. Protection is the social contract 
through which the state provides goods and services to citizens to meet basic rights’ entitlements and to support 
livelihood survival. In essence, the state provides the institutional structure to promote social justice and to 
forge the links between civil and political rights and social and economic and cultural rights, with the authority 
for example to distribute resources as appropriate to those in need (poor, unemployed etc.). However, in 
practice not all nation states are capable of fulfilling their responsibility as the protector of rights or have the 
choice to do so. Some states and leaders, for example, do not act as a vehicle for social justice. This includes 
widely condemned leaders, such as Mugabe in Zimbabwe who have abused the rights of their own citizens and 
Sudanese leaders whose atrocities in Darfur have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the 
displacement of millions.  
Article 5. States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of the human 
rights of peoples and human beings affected by situations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of 
                                                                 
9 Although the right to development has no legal status on its own, its reference to the two international Covenants on Human 
Rights is considered to give legal force to the obligation to respect civil and political rights and social, economic and cultural 
rights (Sengupta, Negi, Basu, 2006, p. 77).  
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racism and racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign 
interference and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and 
refusal to recognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination. 
Critiques of Rights to Self Determination and Rights to Development 
The United States has voiced concerns about “group rights”, “peoples’ rights” and “collective rights” and 
more importantly to the Declaration of The Right to Development from its inception in 1981, when a draft was 
submitted to the Council of the UN. This opposition was such that the US voted against a legally binding 
declaration on the Right to Development, conceding only later when it was agreed that it would be non-binding. 
Effectively the United States opposed the UN Commission, but was comfortable to continue to use a human 
rights agenda to justify actions and interventions that the United States was already engaged in through the 
major development institutions (the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), regional development banks, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and regional forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit). 
More importantly the focal point of the Right to Development is the state as the primary agent of development, 
which is at variance with the neo-liberalism market economy model that has dominated development practises 
in many countries since 1980. Three ideological reasons underpin the US position. The first is concern that as 
the initiator of the right to development, the UN would be used to shape or influence sovereign decisions about 
aid and the transfer of resources under the banner of human rights, effectively allowing the UN to regulate state 
behaviour (Marks, 2004, p. 143). Secondly, the declaration promotes development that gives equal attention 
and consideration to the implementation and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
as specified in Article 6 (2) of the declaration. This provoked major opposition, as voiced by Novak the then 
UN US representative, who refused to accept that civil and political rights could not be fully accorded until an 
ideal economic order was established (Marks, 2004, p. 135). Novak asserted that an ideological commitment to 
freedom and democracy also encourages nation states and individuals to use their own initiative in the market 
and gives all an equal right to compete. The third reason for opposition to the Right to Development was linked 
to the USA’s own use of the human rights agenda as a pragmatic instrument for foreign and security policies. 
Simply the United States did not want to encourage this to be subject to UN scrutiny. The rhetoric of human 
rights has long been integrated into US foreign policy as Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State in the 
1990s, made clear: 
Support for human rights is not just some kind of international social work. It is vital to our security and well 
being; for governments that disregard the rights of their own citizens are not likely to respect the rights of anyone 
else. In this century, virtually every major act of international aggression has been perpetuated by a regime that 
represents political rights. Such regimes are also more likely to spark unrest by persecuting minorities, sheltering 
terrorists, running drugs, or secretly building weapons of mass destruction (Albright, 1998). 
UNESCO’s expert panel on rights to self-determination points out that these rights acknowledge 
representations of peoples. Conceptually this is fine as far as concerns representations of peoples in the shape of 
national liberation movements struggling against colonisation, apartheid or foreign domination. It becomes 
much more problematic when representations are within states and refer to indigenous people and minorities or 
people with different ethnic and religious origins. Understandings of diversity tend to be oversimplified into 
relativism and generalisations about “Western Civilisation”, “Asian Values”, “African Cultures”, and they are 
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often associated with the state and those who govern, whether religious leaders, elected members or military 
junta. Sen draws our attention to the fact that these “leaders” who represent their countries in international 
gatherings and organisations (such as World Bank, IMF, WTO) do not necessarily have a monopoly in their 
country, so that “an adequate approach to development cannot really be so centred only on those in power” 
(Sen, 1999, p. 247). A UNESCO meeting of experts in Barcelona in 1998 focused on this issue: 
“A concept of self-determination which is much broader and more flexible and complex than a definition 
which limits self-determination to separation. Understood this way, self-determination need not threaten the 
territorial integrity of states and can be quite compatible with its preservation. The major obstacles to an 
understanding and acceptance of this concept of self-determination are attachment to the dogmatic concept of the 
nation state, the extreme notion of sovereignty as an exclusive attribute of independent statehood, and territorial 
fixation” (UNESCO, 1998). 
What is important here is recognition of the rights of people and the operation of the democratic system 
within the state. In the context of recent campaigns for democracy across the Middle East and Africa, we have 
been reminded of the role of UN and UNESCO, and its conventions and declarations, in creating a global sense 
of shared responsibility and accountability for human rights protection. However, the reality is that despite the 
fact that human rights laws and conventions have been adopted in Africa since 1960s, the human rights record 
of many states is poor. There are many examples where states have failed to protect individual and groups 
rights and where instead of acting as a primary agent of justice, some states exploit their own citizens (such as 
Zimbabwe’s blood diamond trade or the Sudanese Government’s attacks on civilians etc.) Some states are not 
able to advance justice, but rule through injustice and corrupt institutions and practices or lack the capability for 
good governance. The reasons for this are many and varied and not to be debated here.  
The practical application of rights to self determination and Rights to Development has been difficult, not 
least because its language is at times imprecise and vague and because it is not legally binding and does not 
require legislation or institutional enforcement. In fact “the challenge right from the start has been to translate 
the hopeful but ambiguous language of the Right to Development into concepts that are meaningful for 
economists and useful for the rethinking of the development process” (Marks, 2005, p. 37). Some, including 
human rights lawyers, have argued however that since group rights and the Right to Development have no legal 
status from a legal positivist position, it is not possible to effect or implement the declarations articles and they 
cannot therefore be considered as human rights on the grounds that only rights that are reducible to individuals 
can be “human” rights (Donnelly 2003; Campbell, 2006). A key legal distinction is made between “ought” to 
be and “is” in that laws are empirically observable and can be used to prevent individuals and nations from 
doing harm to others, because they are integral to the judicial system or incorporated into an act of parliament 
or and enshrined in national and international human rights law. In this sense, this standard contrasts with 
natural law theory, which holds that what counts as law is determined by moral values that lie beyond the 
opinions of any particular human beings. In short legal positivism considers that citizens ‘and courts should be 
able to know what the law that binds them is without having to make moral judgments in order to do so’ 
(Campbell, 2006, p. 190). 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the history of the human rights discourse, from the conceptual origins that are 
manifested in the early UN and UNESCO declarations through to more recent debates about the origins of 
group rights as they emerged in the post–colonial era to challenge poverty and inequality. The idea of rights to 
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self determination, are founded in the period of decolonisation, when political movements in Africa found a 
voice in international forums for the first time since the 1948 Declaration. With particular focus on the 
experiences of African nations, it is apparent that a more contextually and culturally sensitive understanding of 
universalism is needed to fully capture the different cultural and historical origins of rights. As it stands, the 
right to self-determination provides a foundation for the promotion of group or peoples’ rights as a challenge to 
poverty and inequality not just between but within nations. But it is universally accepted that the right to self 
determination belongs to individuals and as well as peoples and not to states or government.  
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